

In addition, every level of government in America, every automobile and tire manufacturer and every individual motorist must make highway safety a more urgent priority if we are going to make any meaningful reduction in our highway death toll.

I introduced the first automobile tire safety legislation in the Senate in May 1964. It would have directed the Federal Government to establish national safety standards for all automobile tires. This legislation was revised and introduced April 1, 1965, as bill S. 1463. It provoked an interesting nationwide reaction. It brought denunciation from tire manufacturers who insisted that "tires were safer than ever" and who resisted any kind of safety standards established by a public agency. But the bill also brought thousands of letters from individual motorists who testified to the most shocking examples of tire failure, even on new automobiles. Hearings before the Federal Trade Commission and Senate and House committees soon proved beyond a shadow of doubt that many new cars were being delivered with inadequate tires and that the individual motorist was virtually helpless in selecting the proper tire to suit his needs in an industry which was using a bewildering array of misleading names and size labels.

Thanks to the leadership of the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] and a number of others, this tire safety bill, further revised and improved, passed the Senate by a vote of 79 to 0. Legislation which had been denounced by prominent spokesmen for a major industry was suddenly so acceptable that not a single vote was cast against it.

Realizing that the American highway scandal was not caused by tire failure alone, I introduced another bill, S. 1251, in February of 1965 to authorize the Federal Government to set mandatory minimum safety standards for all automobiles. As I said at the time, it seemed unusual that the Congress asserted the authority to require safety features on cars bought by the Federal Government but did not extend this same protection to cars bought by the average American citizen. This bill also was very sharply criticized by the automobile industry and even by some who appeared to be disinterested persons. One of the criticisms was that there were widely different opinions as to what constituted safe design in an automobile.

To meet that criticism, I introduced legislation, S. 2162, in June of 1965 to authorize the Federal Government to finance and supervise the development and testing of prototypes of truly safe automobiles. The purpose of this bill was to allow engineering research firms to do far-ranging research leading to the construction and testing of cars which would meet the needs of American motorists and at the same time help to reduce the highway death toll.

This bill particularly was scoffed at. The most common taunt was that a car designed for safety would have to look "like a Sherman tank," a remark which simply exposed the lack of understanding

of many people as to what constitutes safe design in an automobile.

It is a source of great personal satisfaction to me that all three of these bills which I introduced over the past 2 years—national safety standards and quality labeling for automobile tires; mandatory minimum safety standards for all automobiles, and authorization for federally financed research in safe automobile design—have now been incorporated into the Traffic Safety Act of 1966 and have passed both Houses of the Congress by unanimous vote.

As I remarked earlier, much remains to be done. At the same time, it is interesting to note that much already has been accomplished. As is so often the case, industry has reacted to this legislation even before it has taken effect. Already, realizing that the Congress finally meant business and the American people were serious about highway safety, the auto makers are announcing 1967 models including such items as collapsible steering columns and dual braking systems as standard features. It is interesting to note that not much more than a year ago the industry was minimizing the need for such features and even criticizing them, just as the industry criticized seat belts a decade earlier.

Because the American public demanded action on safe automobile and tire design and because Congress showed that it was serious about this matter, the new cars rolling off the assembly lines this month will be safer than the cars which otherwise would have been produced. Once this bill takes effect, the 1968 and later models which are produced will be still safer yet. I must emphasize that the passage of this legislation should not signal a let-up in our overall, nationwide campaign for highway safety. But it is a cause for rejoicing that at long last something really significant has been done to raise the standards of the millions of automobiles and tires which play such an important part in the lives of all Americans today.

#### INTERVIEW WITH A MEMBER OF THE VIETCONG

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, yesterday the National Broadcasting Co. on the Huntley-Brinkley show televised an interview between its distinguished correspondent Sander Vanocur and Tran Hoai Nam, a high official of the "National Liberation Front"—otherwise known as the Vietcong.

The interview was filmed in Algeria, and presents a striking view of the Front's attitudes and positions. Arrangements for the interview took several months to accomplish, and I believe the interview is a real tribute to the initiative, enterprise, and journalistic skill of both Mr. Vanocur and NBC News.

What was said in the discussions deserves attention. I ask unanimous consent that a transcript of the broadcast be printed in at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the transcript of interview was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

This interview with Tran Hoai Nam, a high official of the National Liberation Front and the Front's representative in Algeria, took place four days ago in Algiers. The Front is the political arm of the Viet Cong.

I asked for the interview three months ago. At the end of June, I received a request for written questions. The interval between the time the questions were sent and when the interview took place was presumably used to formulate the answers with the leaders of the Front in Vietnam. NBC News agreed to show the interview unedited.

Before the interview began, I proposed an additional question—one about the 1954 Geneva accords, and this request was agreed to.

The interview took place at the Front's headquarters in Algiers, 18 Rue Langevin. Though I believe that Nam understands English and may even speak it, he answered in Vietnamese from a prepared text. A representative for the North Vietnamese news agency read the prepared English translation of the answers. The atmosphere was cordial.

#### SANDER VANOCUR TRAN HOAI NAM INTERVIEW

VANOCUR. What are the conditions, in the opinion of the leaders of the National Liberation Front, which would be necessary to secure an end to the fighting in Vietnam?

TRAN HOAI NAM. The South Vietnamese people fervently cherish peace, a real peace not dissociated from national independence. For our people, peace means that there is no longer any aggressor on the Vietnamese soil. As long as the American troops still hang onto our country, the South Vietnamese people will fight them until the achievement of independence, democracy and peace. This unswerving position has been clearly defined in the statement of the Central Committee of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation on March 22, 1965, as follows:

"The South Vietnamese people and their armed forces are resolved never to lose hold of their arms so long as they have not attained the fundamental aims of their struggle: independence, democracy, peace and neutrality. All talks with the U.S. imperialists at this moment are entirely useless if they still refuse to withdraw from South Vietnam all their troops and means or warfare and those of their satellite countries, if they still have not dismantled all their military bases in South Vietnam, if the traitors still surrender South Vietnamese people's sacred rights to independence and democracy to the U.S. imperialists and if the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, the only genuine representative of the 14 million South Vietnamese people does not have its decisive voice."

VANOCUR. If agreement could be reached on the need for discussions among the interested parties in this conflict, would the National Liberation Front favor a temporary cease-fire to hostilities during the discussions, or would it be necessary for the hostilities to continue during such a conference?

TRAN HOAI NAM. The U.S. rulers have always been trumpeting about negotiation and peace. But it is common knowledge that each time they are about to send reinforcements to South Vietnam and make a further step in escalating their war of aggression, they always resort to their "peace talks" swindle in an attempt to cover up their criminal acts, to fool world opinion and blame the Vietnamese people for unwillingness to enter into "peace talks." In fact, the U.S. rulers are feverishly intensifying their aggressive war in South Vietnam and giving a new and extremely dangerous impulse to their "escalate" in North Vietnam in an attempt to change their position of weakness and defeat into a position of strength and victory and obtain at the conference table what they could not obtain in the battlefield.

In this context and as long as the claims defined by the above mentioned statement of the Central Committee of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation are not realized, any discussion or negotiation would be inappropriate. The entire people of South Vietnam will consequently continue their resolute struggle until final victory.

**VANOCUR.** What are the political objectives of the National Liberation Front and are the leaders of the NLF prepared to participate in elections throughout Vietnam to be supervised by a neutral body?

**TRAN HOAI NAM.** According to the ten-point program defined in its Manifesto, the position of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation on the political field is:

To overthrow the disguised colonial regime and to form a national democratic coalition government which should include the representatives of the various sections of the population, of all the nationalities, political parties, religious beliefs and all the patriotic personalities.

To set up a progressive regime of broad democracy and abolish the present dictatorial constitution of the puppet government.

To carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality. The national democratic government is disposed to establish diplomatic relations with all the other countries regardless of their political regimes and in conformity with the principles of peaceful co-existence as defined by the Bandung Conference, and unite closely with peace loving countries and neutral countries. . . . South Vietnam should not join any military alliance. It is disposed to receive economic aid from any country which would grant it without any binding condition.

**VANOCUR.** Is unification with the North a political objective of the National Liberation Front?

**TRAN HOAI NAM.** The South Vietnam National Front for Liberation stands for the gradual reunification of the country by peaceful means, on the principle of negotiations and discussions between the two zones and all forms and measures to be applied for the benefit of the people and Fatherland, because the reunification of our country is the ardent aspiration of all our compatriots.

The South Vietnam National Front for Liberation will consequently organize free general elections.

As "for general elections in South Vietnam" you have made mention of, I should assert that as long as the U.S. and their satellites do not withdraw their armed forces from South Vietnam it is absolutely impossible to talk about free elections. Not to mention the so-called elections of the "Constituent Assembly" or any other elections of the "National Assembly" staged by the traitors in Saigon on U.S. orders, which are nothing but political bluffs. Such facetious elections will never be recognized by the South Vietnamese people.

**VANOCUR.** If agreement as it seems cannot be reached on major substantive issues, would the National Liberation Front be prepared to discuss an exchange of prisoners with the United States? In this connection, and perhaps as a useful first step, would the National Liberation Front be prepared to immediately arrange for the release of a United States AID official, Mr. Gustave Hertz?

**TRAN HOAI NAM.** As long as the U.S. government persist in refusing to recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, there is no possibility to consider any discussion on the problem of American prisoners.

**VANOCUR.** Have your representatives here or elsewhere in the world, met with official representatives of the United States, and if the answer is in the negative, are your leaders prepared for such a meeting or meetings, at this time or in the future?

**TRAN HOAI NAM.** The leaders of the South Vietnam Front for Liberation have never met officially or unofficially with the U.S. representatives. At present, while the U.S. are continuing to intensify and extend the war in Vietnam, if there is any U.S. suggestion about such a meeting, this can only be considered as a maneuver in the fallacious "peace" policy of President Johnson with a view to cover up his aggressive policy of war and hoodwink American and world opinion.

**VANOCUR.** There has been some talk of late in the United States that perhaps the 1954 Geneva Accords have no application to the present conflict, have perhaps been overtaken by events. What is the official position of the National Liberation Front with regard to the Accord?

**TRAN HOAI NAM.** The essential spirit of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam is to recognize the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam. If the U.S. government acts in accordance with the engagement made by its representative at the 1954 Geneva Conference, Mr. Bedell Smith, that is to say if it respects the 1954 Geneva Agreements, real peace has been restored in South Vietnam and the reunification of the whole of Vietnam, an independent and sovereign country has been realized since long.

The South Vietnam National Front for Liberation did not participate to the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam. Consequently, it is not bound by these agreements. Nevertheless, it is striving for the realization of the fundamental principles of these agreements because they are in conformity with the just aspirations and rights of the South Vietnamese people.

To conclude, I take this opportunity to express my heart-felt thanks to the intellectuals, religious groups, students, workers and all other men of good-will in the United States who have time and again manifested and continue to manifest their solidarity with the Vietnamese people in the latter's struggle for national salvation.

**VANOCUR.** Thank you.

**VANOCUR CLOSER**

The important points in an interview in a foreign language are not always immediately obvious. But the tone in this one was unmistakable. It was defiance.

In revolutionary movements, defiance can often be a mask for weakness. That may be what we witnessed in this interview. But we cannot be sure. In my opinion, the important points were: the curt refusal to discuss an exchange of prisoners, their unwillingness to meet with U.S. representatives, and the sharp emphasis on fighting to the end. I came away with this impression: These people offered absolutely nothing, in manner or in words, which would suggest, even faintly, an early or a painless end to this struggle.

This is Sander Vanocur, NBC News.

#### LONG WAR IN VIETNAM INDICATED

**Mr. McGOVERN.** Mr. President, last night, NBC Commentator Sander Vanocur was featured in an important filmed interview with an official of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front. Three months ago, Mr. Vanocur requested an interview with a representative of the political arm of the Vietcong. In June, he was asked to submit written questions which he did. Four days ago, the interview was granted at the National Liberation Front office in Algiers. Mr. Tran Hoai Nam, the group's representative in Algeria, answered the questions submitted by Mr. Vanocur.

The clear import of the interview is that at least at the present time our

escalating military pressure on the Vietcong is not prompting them to take a more favorable attitude toward negotiations. Mr. Vanocur reached the conclusion that "these people offered absolutely nothing in manner or in words which would suggest even faintly an early or a painless end to this struggle."

In the course of the interview, the Vietcong spokesman said that the political aims for the guerrilla movement are to overthrow the "disguised colonial regime" in Saigon and replace it with a "progressive" coalition government. He further said that it is "absolutely impossible to talk about free elections" as long as American troops are overrunning Vietnam. The Vietcong spokesman said that the U.S. peace offensives have all been designed to deceive public opinion as a cloak for an escalating U.S. military involvement.

The distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Ribicoff], whose remarks precede mine, under the headline "Interview With a Member of the Vietcong," has already placed in the Record the text of the interview. I join him in urging Members of Congress and the general public to read it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article by Mr. Max Frankel, published in the New York Times of September 1, 1966, relative to Mr. Vanocur's interview, be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Sept. 1, 1966]

**VIETCONG SPOKESMAN IS DEFIANT ON PEACE TALKS—AID IN ALGERIA, IN REPLIES TO AMERICAN TV QUERIES, SAYS U.S. TROOPS MUST LEAVE**

(By Max Frankel)

WASHINGTON, August 31.—South Vietnam's National Liberation Front expressed a defiant and extremely tough line toward negotiations of any kind in a statement prepared for an American television showing tonight.

The front, the political parent group of the Vietcong, said peace talks would be "inappropriate" as long as American troops remained in Vietnam. It accused American officials of seeking negotiations only to convert defeat into victory and to "obtain at the conference table what they could not obtain in the battlefield."

The Communist-led organization refused even to consider discussions about prisoners until the United States formally recognized it as a legitimate political group. Washington has consistently denounced the front as the "creature" of North Vietnam's Communist Government.

The views of the front were given to Sander Vanocur, a correspondent of the National Broadcasting Company, by Tran Hoai Nam, the group's representative in Algeria. In presenting the interview on the Huntley-Brinkley Report, Mr. Vanocur said he had requested it three months ago and submitted written questions at the end of June.

TOOK PLACE 4 DAYS AGO

The interview took place four days ago at the front's office in Algiers. Mr. Vanocur said that he presumed the answers had been cleared with front leaders in Vietnam over the summer.

"For our people, peace means that there is no longer any aggressor on Vietnamese soil," Mr. Nam said. "As long as the American troops still hang onto our country, the South

Vietnamese people will fight them until the achievement of independence, democracy and peace."

He said that there had been no change in the front's policy since the declaration of its central committee on March 22, 1965. That declaration vowed continuation of the war until American troops were withdrawn and the front had gained a "decisive" voice in the government of South Vietnam.

Mr. Nam denounced calls for negotiation without withdrawal as a "swindle" designed to cloak intensification of the pace of war by the United States.

He defined the front's political aims as the overthrow of the "disguised colonial regime" now governing in Saigon, formation of a broadly based and "progressive" coalition government and adoption of a foreign policy of "peace and neutrality." He described the front, however, as "the only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people."

The front advocates "gradual" reunification of North and South Vietnam "on the principle of negotiations and discussions between the two zones," the spokesman said. It is "absolutely impossible to talk about free elections," he added, as long as American and other foreign troops are stationed in Vietnam.

Mr. Nam dismissed the Sept. 11 elections for a constituent assembly as a "political bluff" staged by "traitors in Saigon on U.S. orders."

#### CALLS EFFORTS A MANEUVER

The leaders of the front have never met officially or unofficially with American representatives, Mr. Nam said, and can only regard suggestions for such meetings while the war is being intensified "as a maneuver in the fallacious peace policy of President Johnson."

He ended the interview by expressing "heartfelt thanks to the intellectuals, religious groups, students, workers and all other men of good will in the United States who have time and again manifested and continue to manifest their solidarity with the Vietnamese people in the latter's struggle for national salvation."

Mr. Nam spoke in Vietnamese from a prepared text. He had a prepared English translation read before the camera by a representative of the North Vietnamese news agency. Mr. Vanocur described the atmosphere of the talk as cordial, but came away with the "impression that the front had offered nothing in either manner or words to suggest an early or painless end to the war."

#### REPORT OF PLAN FOR LONG WAR

PNOMPENH, CAMBODIA, August 31.—Wilfred Burchett, a leftist Australian journalist who returned Monday from Vietcong areas in Vietnam, says that insurgent leaders expect that the war will go on for years. Mr. Burchett interviewed Nguyen Huu Tho, chairman of the National Liberation Front.

The Australian also said that economic planning in North Vietnam was based on the assumption that the war with the United States would be a long one.

Mr. Burchett said that the Vietcong leaders saw no point in entering into negotiations with the United States as long as the Johnson Administration treated the war in South Vietnam simply as "aggression from the North." He expressed the opinion that the United States could break the impasse over negotiations only by expressing readiness to negotiate directly with national Liberation Front.

Mr. Burchett said that Mr. Tho had told him that the front's political position had not changed, that the front was still ready to form a broad coalition government that would embrace all political groupings in South Vietnam and eventually negotiate with Hanoi on unification of the country.

Mr. Burchett reported that he had found the Vietcong more confident than during his last visit in November when they were experiencing some uneasiness about the American military build-up.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the Vanocur interview is one more indication that our assumption that the Vietcong and North Vietnam would come to the conference table if they are only hit hard enough militarily may be a questionable assumption. Writing in this same vein, Mr. Stewart Alsop suggests in the September 10 issue of the Saturday Evening Post that our policy planners may have made "a great miscalculation" in concluding that our mounting military pressure on North Vietnam and the Vietcong is the road to the conference table.

Mr. Alsop quotes Secretary of Defense McNamara as follows:

The essence of our military effort there must be to show the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong that they can't win in the South. Then we presume that they will move to a settlement, either through negotiations or other action.

Mr. Alsop also quotes the opposing view of North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh:

Johnson and his clique should realize this: . . . The war may last five, ten, twenty years or longer. Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities and enterprises may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese people will not be intimidated. . . . In the past, we defeated the Japanese fascists and the French colonialists in much more difficult junctures. . . . The Vietnamese people will win.

Then Mr. Alsop concludes:

If the war drags on and on, the pressure to fight "our kind of war," and to "occupy his territory"—or at least some of it—will mount inexorably. The bombing of the demilitarized zone is already a step in that direction. Wars have a terrible logic of their own, which is quite unlike the logic of intelligent and reasonable men, examining charts in air-conditioned offices.

In short, if the McNamara thesis turns out to be a great miscalculation, the United States could find itself involved, all unwittingly, in a military occupation of a large hostile population. The United States could also find itself involved, all unwittingly, in a very much larger and very much uglier war.

Surely all sensible men must hope, and also pray, that the McNamara thesis will prove correct, and that now that we have indeed shown the Communists that "they can't win the South," they will follow the Washington script and "move to a settlement." Otherwise, despite the brilliant job our forces have been doing in Vietnam, the outlook is for a much larger, longer and bloodier war than Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara or anyone else allowed for.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this thoughtful and sobering piece by Mr. Alsop be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### VIETNAM: GREAT MISCALCULATION?

(By Stewart Alsop)

Robert S. McNamara: "The essence of our military effort there must be to show the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong that they can't win in the South. [Then] we presume that they will move to a settlement, either through negotiation or other action."

Lyndon B. Johnson: "Our diplomatic reports indicate that the opposing forces no longer really expect a military victory in South Vietnam."

Ho Chi Minh: "Johnson and his clique should realize this: . . . The war may last five, ten, twenty years or longer. Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities and enterprises may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese people will not be intimidated. . . . In the past, we defeated the Japanese fascists and the French colonialists in much more difficult junctures. . . . The Vietnamese people will win."

The McNamara thesis, that the Communist side in Vietnam "will move to a settlement," once they are convinced that "they can't win in the South," is the basic assumption of American strategy in Vietnam. In testimony on Capitol Hill, in private conversations and on-the-record interviews, McNamara and other Administration spokesmen have reiterated this basic assumption again and again.

"We're trying to show them they can't win the South," McNamara said some weeks ago in an interview with this reporter for the Post, "and that the longer they try to do so, the heavier will be the penalty they pay in the North. . . . They're paying a real penalty already."

The "penalty" has been increasing steadily ever since. And surely by this time Ho Chi Minh and his clique are sufficiently aware of the mountainous American military superiority so that they "no longer really expect a military victory in South Vietnam."

Did Ho Chi Minh therefore obey the script, as written in Washington, and "move to a settlement"? Not at all. Instead, a couple of weeks after the President's triumphant press-conference announcement, quoted above, he went on Hanoi radio and made the speech which is also quoted above, and which breathes defiance in every line. And at least as this is written, there is no evidence whatever that the Communists are getting ready to "move to settlement" in Vietnam.

Thus it is surely about time to face up to the fact that the McNamara thesis, the basic American assumption about the war in Vietnam, may be dead wrong. It is a perfectly logical thesis. Since he clearly "can't win in the South," the sensible thing for Ho Chi Minh to do is to cut his losses. But maybe Ho Chi Minh isn't "sensible." Maybe he means just what he says.

"You mean you think Ho is an Asian Churchill?" a high official asked with a derisive laugh when this possibility was suggested to him. "You mean 'We'll fight on the beaches'—all that sort of thing?"

Ho may not be an Asian Churchill, but Churchill's decision to fight on in 1940 was by sensible standards an illogical decision—he simply did not have the means to defeat Hitler, and Hitler had offered rather tempting peace terms. Again and again in history, for reasons irrational and even dishonorable, men have fought on when their cause seemed hopeless. Even a rat, when cornered, displays a terrible courage.

Moreover, all men—including Ho Chi Minh and his aging lieutenants—are products of their past. As Ho said in his radio speech, he and his Viet Minh guerrillas "defeated the Japanese fascists and the French colonialists" even when the Viet Minh controlled no oil depots, no factories and no town in Indochina bigger than a big village. When the Italian professor Giorgio La Pira visited Ho last autumn, Ho remarked to him that, even if the Americans bombed North Vietnam "back to the stone age," he and his men would be no worse off than they were before Dienbienphu.

Obviously the possibility that the McNamara thesis may turn out to be wrong has occurred to the Administration policy makers, including Secretary McNamara. This accounts for the warnings, much repeated in

recent weeks, that the war may be long and hard. But how long and how hard?

One well-informed official believes ("but don't quote me") that the Communist side cannot continue the fight for more than two years at the most—i.e., the war will end before the next presidential election. "The V.C. and the North Vietnamese," this official points out, "are taking more than one thousand fatal casualties a week—that's more than fifty thousand dead a year, not counting wounded and defections. They just can't go on taking that kind of punishment indefinitely."

A thousand dead men is a lot of dead men, week after week. But there are 16 million people in North Vietnam, and many millions more under Communist control in South Vietnam. American judgments of what the Vietnamese Communists can or cannot "go on taking" have been wrong in the past. No informed official denies that the war could last more than another two years—perhaps a lot more.

In that case, one thing is absolutely predictable. The pressure to follow the prescription of Sen. RICHARD RUSSELL—"go in and win or get out"—will mount and mount. Studies have of course been made within the Administration of the "feasibility of extrication" as proposed to escalation. The conclusion has always been the same. There is no presently visible way to "get out"—short of national dishonor. To accept national dishonor as the chief distinguishing mark of the Johnson Administration is simply not in the character of Lyndon Johnson.

That leaves "go in and win." As a very high military man remarked unhappily to this reporter not long ago: "This isn't our kind of war—we were always taught that the purpose of war was to subjugate the enemy and occupy his territory." The only way to "go in and win," short of using nuclear weapons to turn North Vietnam into a wilderness, is to attempt to "subjugate the enemy and occupy his territory," the most obvious first move being an amphibious landing to cut the Northern regime off from the South.

This may seem totally improbable. But a couple of years ago it seems totally improbable that the United States would send upwards of 400,000 men to fight in South Vietnam.

If the war drags on and on, the pressure to fight "our kind of war," and to "occupy his territory"—or at least some of it—will mount inexorably. The bombing of the demilitarized zone is already a step in that direction. Wars have a terrible logic of their own, which is quite unlike the logic of intelligent and reasonable men, examining charts in air-conditioned offices.

In short, if the McNamara thesis turns out to be a great miscalculation, the United States could find itself involved, all unwittingly, in a military occupation of a large hostile population. The United States could also find itself involved, all unwittingly, in a very much larger and very much uglier war.

Surely all sensible men must hope, and also pray, that the McNamara thesis will prove correct, and that now that we have indeed shown the Communists that "they can't win the South," they will follow the Washington script and "move to a settlement." Otherwise, despite the brilliant job our forces have been doing in Vietnam, the outlook is for a much larger, longer and bloodier war than Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara or anyone else allowed for.

us some good news—he said we are winning the battle of conservation.

There is no doubt that Lyndon B. Johnson will go down in history as one of our greatest conservation Presidents. His address at Burlington illuminates his determination to save our priceless natural heritage.

Because the address is a fine summation of his stewardship of these resources, I ask unanimous consent that it appear at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT AT  
BURLINGTON, VT.

I have been reading in the magazines and seeing on television lately some of the problems at Yosemite Park, three thousand miles from your Green Mountain National Forest. But if you will ask the Forest Rangers here, they will tell you that they face some of the same problems.

The problem—as it was explained in those reports—is summed up in one word: Crowds. So many people are swarming to Yosemite—and to the Green Mountain National Forest which was visited last year by 800,000 Americans—and to all our other national parks and national forests—that when they arrive, what they have come to see and experience is obscured by crowds. We are told they simply move the city with them.

And this, as it has been reported, is due to a host of 20th century maladies: a population explosion, a rootless streak in our national character, and an urge to pave the whole country with concrete.

Let me tell you here today that the reality of what's happening in outdoor America is just not quite that simple, or quite that dreadful.

Let me note first, that crowds at Yosemite and crowds at the Green Mountain National Forest are not primarily a symptom of either a malignant population explosion or of some kind of spreading urban madness.

These crowds show that more Americans are out enjoying themselves than ever before; they have cars, and vacations, and fine roads to follow. That's a good way to spend part of a summer, and I think that most of the people at Yosemite and at the Green Mountain National Forest feel the same way.

When I was a boy, the 50-mile trip from Johnson City to the State capitol at Austin was considered a long journey. My father used to give a nickel to the first youngster who could see the capitol dome on the horizon in Austin. That was his way of keeping us awake. Today, people travel hundreds and thousands of miles just to see the beauty and the grandeur of the American countryside.

Thirty years ago, when I first came to Congress, we started to build an America where men and women and children could earn enough to own a car and to enjoy a vacation and to travel where they pleased. I do not think we should apologize here today for the fact that many Americans are enjoying precisely that kind of a vacation this summer. We do not need to apologize that the number of campers and boaters and travelers are soaring. For this is good news to those of us who have worked to help build this kind of America.

So I did not come here to be a crisis-monger and to decry the fact that crowds of Americans on this August day are out enjoying themselves. Something in that speaks of America.

But now that we have noted what is in fact happening, and noted why it is happening, we must also realize that as our ability to enjoy nature and leisure is increasing sharply, we have to work hard toward con-

servation if we are to pass along our heritage of national beauty to our children. We also need to improve upon this heritage where we have allowed it to tarnish.

As I look out over Lake Champlain, I cannot help recalling that only yesterday I visited another lake that aroused an entirely different emotion in me. That emotion was discouragement. For Lake Erie is polluted. It has become a casualty of heedless progress.

Some already say that Lake Erie can never be reclaimed. I do not accept that view. But I do know that it can be reclaimed only by one of the most massive efforts in the history of this country.

And Lake Erie is not alone. As I flew to New England yesterday, I saw other areas that have been stained. I saw smog hanging over cities, rivers abandoned by man and fish alike, rusting skeletons of discarded automobiles littering our countryside. I saw cities that housed within their limits the slums of filth and neglect.

Much of America is still a beautiful land, but we have already foolishly sacrificed too much of our treasure through indifference. I want to tell you here today that we can be indifferent no longer.

Just as I am no crisis-monger, neither am I a stand-patter. This is not the best of all possible worlds—far from it—and we are out to make it a better place to live and a better place to enjoy.

That is why we have to ask ourselves today the hard questions about tomorrow. Where will Americans swim? Where will Americans camp? Where will we experience the joys of nature as God really created it? Where will we fish the good streams and where will we relax away from the noise of factories and automobiles?

These are some of the questions that must be answered and answered now.

Each year in America about one million acres of virgin land turns beneath the blade of the bulldozer. Highways, shopping centers, housing developments and airports replace trees and streams and woods where young boys once dreamed dreams.

These are man-made projects to build a better life for Americans, but too often they spread ugliness and blight farther and farther across our land.

Accordingly, we must be ever vigilant to see that we not only use land but that we save land as well.

When I assumed this office I said I was going to be a conservation President. Thanks to Mrs. Johnson—and to the imagination and efforts of leaders like your own Governor Hoff—I have become a beautification President as well.

I have had help; a lot of it. I have had the help of two of the great Congresses in the history of this Nation. Working together, we have given the American people 48 major conservation bills in the more than 2½ years that I have been President.

We have set aside 145 miles of warm, sandy seashore for Americans to enjoy.

We have set aside 550,000 more acres for our national park system.

We have passed the most far-reaching anti-water- and air-pollution measures of all time.

We have constructed dams to protect our citizens from the ravages of floods—and behind those dams we have built lakes and recreation areas for boating and camping and fishing and swimming.

We have established a Land and Water Conservation Fund to help states and counties and towns acquire their own recreation areas.

We have promised our motorists that their major highways will be free of unsightly billboards and will be screened from ugly junkyards.

We have passed a Wilderness Act that in the years to come will set aside nine million

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S REMARKS  
AT BURLINGTON, VT.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, when the President of the United States spoke at Burlington, Vt., on August 20, he gave



in order to cut across "all geographic, economic and cultural boundaries." One of Howe's first offerings was federal dollars in the form of grants to cities "adventurous enough to join us" in planning such enterprises.

It reflects no credit whatever on the new District of Columbia school board that its members now have accepted this invitation.

The idea of applying such "parks" as a substitute for Washington's traditional system of neighborhood schools strikes us as nothing but a pipe dream. The sheer enormity of the scheme, in terms of dollars and land requirements, is enough to chill the wildest optimist. The need for new and replacement schools in Washington is urgent. But many, many of the existing structures provide fine new modern facilities. To propose seriously, as has been proposed, that these buildings might be scrapped as schools and converted to some other public use is simply incomprehensible.

In the minds of Howe and others, the educational parks are seen as a means of establishing racial and economic "balance," of moving the children of low-income families, during their classroom hours, out of the ghetto.

In all candor, however, what advantage, educational or otherwise, could accrue to the deprived child, desperately in need of personal attention, who became only one of 20,000 on a single campus? Education is the process of doing something with an individual child, in the context of the teacher-pupil relationship. It is not the process of dealing with great masses of children. From the viewpoint of sound education, the theory is not supported by a single demonstrable justification.

The racial mix in the classroom, of which Howe speaks, could not be substantially affected by educational parks in a city with a school population already over 90 percent Negro. In the Washington Metropolitan Area, the goal of a more sensible, reasonable racial balance in the schools will remain an illusion until more Negro families locate in the suburbs, and until more white families with children return to the city.

No doubt we will be told that the proposed educational-park study is after all only a study, and that we need as never before to seek out new, improved techniques of teaching.

Quite so. Innovation and experimentation are essential, within the sound, proven concept of neighborhood schools. The advocates of educational parks are following a will-o'-the-wisp, which should not be allowed to divert attention from the tough job at hand.

### To Amend the Peace Corps Act

SPEECH  
OF

HON. JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 31, 1966

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 16574) to amend the Peace Corps (75 Stat. 642) as amended, and for other purposes.

Mr. SCHMIDHAUSER. Mr. Chairman, I want to express my strong support for H.R. 16574, and for the Peace Corps program. The many Americans who are serving selflessly throughout the world deserve our firm support and our sincere appreciation. We are indeed fortunate to have so many who are willing

to give so much on behalf of their country and mankind.

As we act on this important legislation, I believe it also is a most appropriate time to pause, and reflect on the great contributions made by our beloved late President John F. Kennedy, who so firmly believed in the concept underlying the Peace Corps program. As a professor of constitutional law at the University of Iowa at the time the Peace Corps began, I clearly recall the enthusiasm and the confidence of the Peace Corps trainees toward the goals of the program and the late President. I believe this spirit has contributed much to the Nation and to the world and I believe all of us should be forever appreciative of President Kennedy for the forceful leadership he gave to the Peace Corps program.

In conclusion, I again want to express my support of this bill and this vital program. I very much regret that a long-standing commitment prevented me from being with the overwhelming number of my colleagues whom I am confident will support this vital program.

### Support for U.S. Servicemen Fighting in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR.

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 1, 1966

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, I have received a very eloquent letter from a young resident of Glen Ridge, N.J., Miss Jane Ellen Prahst, which I commend to the attention of my colleagues.

Young Americans are risking their lives in Vietnam for the cause of freedom. And while I have personally witnessed their fine morale and dedication to duty, it must at times be disheartening to them to learn of activities back home "condemning our being there."

So it is most encouraging to read Miss Prahst's moving thoughts about backing up our men, both through positive action and in spirit. I am convinced she is expressing what the majority of Americans feel about this struggle for freedom to which we are committed. I include the text of Miss Prahst's fine letter in the Record at this point:

GLEN RIDGE, N.J.,  
August 25, 1966.

HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR.,  
House Office Building,  
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR MR. RODINO: I find it a little difficult in writing a letter to someone of your position and with a busy schedule such as yours, but I thought you might be able to help me.

Mr. RODINO, I'm tired of reading about Viet Nam and not being able to do anything to help. I feel so helpless just sitting back and reading how our men are being killed so that others might experience the freedom that our country stands for. If I were a man, I'd be able to stand up and proudly defend our reason for being there, but I'm a young woman in my early twenties. What is there for me to do? I wish I had an an-

swer to this question. If I had any medical background, I'd gladly volunteer my services and aid our boys; but there stands the word "I".

Is there anything I can do? The "morale" of our men stationed in Viet Nam seems such an important factor with all the "Anti-Viet Nam demonstrations" that are taking place. It seems a shame that our Armed Forces should have to learn how others are taking our stand of being in Viet Nam so vehemently. It isn't by choice that our men have taken up position in defending Viet Nam, so why must they face ridicule from their fellow countrymen? It must be rather difficult for these men to face the possibility of dying every time that they go out on a patrol in search of possible Viet Cong strongholds and sometimes they must wonder—"why is this happening to me?" Every last one of us here at home should be standing behind these men if only in "spirit" and not condemning our being there. The fact is—"we are there" and there is nothing any of us can do about it at this stage of the game. There is no turning back and there are too many "little" people counting on our securing a piece of freedom for them to experience. I can't defend whether it is right or wrong in our being there, but I enjoy freedom as much as the next person, and I want others to have a chance to experience it too. If this is the real reason for our being there, then I am for it!

Now, back to the reason for writing this letter, which is there anything that I can do? If there is any answer to this question, you might have one. I could help with mailing of food packages, and writing letters; but I don't know of anyone there now. So you see this doesn't answer my question either. I realize there must be fellows who don't hear from home, but how does one go about finding them?

I sincerely hope there is some small task that I can do to help out. It can be terribly lonely being so far away from home without being in a "war-torn" country, such as Viet Nam. Mail call, so I am told, can help to pass the days and bring "home" a little closer.

Any help that you might be able to extend to me on this matter would be greatly appreciated. There must be something I can do and I'll keep looking until I find it.

Respectfully,

JANE ELLEN PRAHST.

### The Next Step

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 31, 1966

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, during the last few weeks we have heard renewed talk about increased escalation of the war in Vietnam. There are persistent rumors that American troops strength will continue to climb at least until it hits 600,000.

The logic behind the talk of those who urge escalation is often inexplicable until put clearly by one who views the war with distance and perspective. Such an observer is Joseph Kraft, who explains the reasons for escalation in a column in the Washington Post.

I urge all those who would like to understand the rationale of the escalator to read "The Next Step" which follows:

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 31, 1966]

#### THE NEXT STEP

(By Joseph Kraft)

Fighting the war in Vietnam is like learning according to Pope: "Hills peep o'er hills, and Alps on Alps arise."

Just now there are coming into view the hills announcing the next bunch of Alps. And with them come reasons, more abundant and pressing than ever, for trying to slow down and break up the whole crazy, deadly process of escalation. The more so as there are now intimations of pressures pushing Hanoi, after years of straddling, to lean toward Moscow to the disadvantage of Peking.

The next military step in Vietnam is for American troops to carry the war to the Mekong delta below Saigon, where about 40 percent of the Vietnamese population is concentrated.

Up to now, the American effort has been concentrated on engaging the main force units of the other side in the relatively unpopulated highlands of central Vietnam. In support of that effort, there has been a steady bombing of the enemy approaches to the highlands stretching all the way up the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the roads and supply bases of North Vietnam.

It happens that fighting in the highlands and bombing the North is ideally suited to American forces, with their control of the air and enormous advantage in fire power. But despite all the stuff talked about North Vietnam being the heart and soul of the enemy effort, the bombing of the North and the fighting in the highlands have not yielded decisive results.

The reason is that the true heart and soul of the enemy effort lies in the South, and notably in the delta. Large sections of the region have been under the control of the Vietcong for two decades. In hundreds of villages, the leading role is played by Vietcong officials and sympathizers.

In the matter of supplies, the other side gets a very large part of its rice ration from the delta. And according to one knowledgeable estimate, something like 3,000 new men are recruited by the other side in the delta every month.

This steady stream of supplies and recruits has finally made it plain that an acceptable result cannot be reached in Vietnam without control of the delta. It has also indicated the weakness of the South Vietnamese army commanders who have had the job of holding the delta up to now.

In these conditions, the military is mounting, both in Saigon and Washington, a heavy campaign for the commitment of substantial American forces to the delta. That is what the talk about a doubling of the present troop commitment is really all about. And while no decision has yet been made, the pattern of the past suggests that unless there is effective public resistance here, the military will eventually have its ways.

As it happens, there is every reason for resistance. By going into the delta, American troops for the first time would be fighting in heavily populated zones. The occasional accidental bombings of friendly villages, and the dispiriting social dislocation of Saigon, would be repeated on a grand and tragic scale.

Moreover, the fighting will surely not be easy. If only from disease, heavy American casualties are almost certain in the swampy, malaria-ridden areas where the Vietcong has been dug in for years.

But all the lessons of the past suggest that in the face of setbacks in the delta, the reaction in Washington would be to intensify even further the bombing of North Vietnam. And at this juncture, any further increase in the bombing of the North is likely to yield what most needs to be avoided—a direct encounter with the Russians.

For just now a new opportunity seems to be opening up. An abundance of signs—the visit to Moscow of North Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong and Defense Minister Vom Nguyen Giap, the word that the Russians are now training North Vietnamese pilots, the vicious silliness that is going on in China—all suggests that Hanoi, under pressure to choose between Moscow and Peking, is edging toward the Russians.

In these circumstances, this country should be seeking for ways to make it easy for the Russians to promote a negotiation. We should be thinking about political changes in Saigon, about new statements on Vietnamese unification and about negotiating with the National Liberation Front, not about plunging into a deep military morass in the delta.

### Antitreason Legislation and the House Un-American Activities Committee

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

### HON. HARLAN HAGEN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 30, 1966

Mr. HAGEN of California. Mr. Speaker, I attended the recent hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee dealing with the need for new legislation to punish treasonable acts in connection with was resistance activities of the Progressive Labor Party and other groups. As a result, I was convinced that the hearings served a valuable purpose in demonstrating that that legislation was necessary to establish criminal penalties for overt acts designed to impede our military activities in Vietnam.

As a consequence, I introduced a companion bill to that earlier introduced by Congressman Pool and others. The hearings proved that overt acts of obstruction of our war effort were taking place and in addition that many of them were committed by persons totally opposed to our system of society and government who could properly be labeled subversive and as being the allies of our enemies and acting from that motive.

These exposures are valuable because they should serve as a warning to other persons who have sincere motives for opposing this or any other war that there is a real possibility that they may be used by subversive groups who do not share their nonsubversive motivation.

I was somewhat disappointed by the press comment on the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings with the exception of an article which I submit to you herewith by Roscoe Drummond which appeared in the Christian Science Monitor on August 29, 1966. I agree with all of the observations of the article with the exception of the conclusion that no new law is needed. The article follows:

#### ACTIVITIES UN-AMERICAN

(By Roscoe Drummond)

WASHINGTON.—There are things to be said against and for the recent hearings by the House un-American Activities Committee. Its objective was to look into overt actions

within the United States aiding the Vietnamese Communists.

Some criticized the hearings as a "spectacle" and a "circus," saw it hurting the image of Congress and providing a forum for the so-called "new left" out of proportion to its power.

These are valid criticisms, but I believe they are outweighed by the value of what came out.

#### PURPOSEFUL DISORDER

There were, indeed, raucous and unruly scenes which at times turned this congressional inquiry into a vulgar burlesque. But it was the purposeful disorder of the witnesses, their claque in the public gallery, and some of their lawyers who made it so.

I doubt if there could have been anything approaching an orderly hearing unless it had been held in executive session with the public barred and only one witness called at a time. But the purpose of the hearing was exposure and therefore the risks of purposeful disorder were accepted.

The risks were worth it.

Fortunately the witnesses did all that was needed to alert the nation to some things which make clearer the motive and acts of those behind much of the pro-Viet Cong demonstrations on campuses, lie-downs in front of troop trains, and attempts to immobilize draft boards.

#### EXPERTS KNEW

The experts who constantly examine the tactics and personnel of Communist operations in the United States knew all of these facts, but it is well that they have now been spread on the front pages and on the television screens across the country.

Have you been thinking that the campaign to raise money to help the Viet Cong and the efforts to slow up the flow of supplies to United States troops in Vietnam were the spontaneous outbursts of Americans who believe that the defense of South Vietnam is an awful evil which must be brought to an end by any means?

Well, these "spontaneous" actions are proved to be the work of the "Progressive Labor Party" which is the Communist pro-Peking offshoot of the Communist Party, U.S.A. Its officials have so admitted. They're rather proud of it.

Did you think that the visit of 60 college students to Cuba in 1963 to show how much they esteemed Castro and want to help him export communism to other Latin countries—did you think this was a spontaneous gesture by American youth eager to show its independence?

It wasn't. This spontaneous gesture was conceived and brought off by the Communist pro-Peking May 2d Movement which was the predecessor of the Communist pro-Peking "Progressive Labor Party."

I doubt that many people would be aware of these facts if the committee hadn't allowed its obstreperous witnesses to have their shouting match on Capitol Hill this past week.

#### COMMUNIST STRATEGY

There is no reason to be surprised that such witnesses should resort to calculated disorder to try to discredit a congressional hearing. Communists have no respect for democratic institutions. They use them only to try to destroy them. This is long-established Communist strategy. And as the nation watched them in action, I doubt if the purposeful disorder of the Communist witnesses discredited Congress as much as they exposed and discredited themselves.

No new law is needed to cope with anything these pro-Peking, pro-Hanoi Communists may do. They will have lost most of their power to do harm as long as we recognize that these would-be stimulators of pro-Viet Cong attitudes and actions are the work of a few Americans whose loyalty is not to their own country but to a foreign power.